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DAVID DAVIS,

it

Priority 2

Defendant/Appellant. i
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of a second degree
felony in the Second District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp.
1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Should the trial court have suppressed evidence of

defendant's previous conviction for drug distribution in his
trial for another charge of drug distribution where the evidence
was relevant and more probative than prejudicial?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSf STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah R. Evid. 403 (1989)t
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of
time.
Although relevant/ evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

Utah R. Bvid. 404(b) (1989)i
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
Utah R. Bvid. 609(a) (1989)t
(a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during crossexamination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with distribution of a
controlled substance, cocaine, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986).

A jury

convicted defendant as charged on August 26, 1988, with the
Honorable Robert L. Newey presiding.

Judge Ronald Hyde imposed a

one to fifteen year prison term on defendant on December 2, 1988.
Judge Hyde stayed the sentence, placed defendant on probation and
ordered him to attend the Odyssey House Program.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State agrees with the Statement of Facts contained
in defendant's brief except that beginning with the last two
sentences on page 3 of that brief, defendant's characterization

of the trial court's oral ruling on the motion to exclude the
evidence of defendant's prior conviction is somewhat confusing.
Judge Newey divided the issue into two parts; 1) whether the
State would be allowed to use defendant's prior conviction for
impeachment purposes, and 2) whether the State could offer
evidence of defendant's prior conviction in its case in chief to
explain defendant's presence in the jail and to set the context
of the informant's offer to arrange the drug transaction with
defendant (T. 10). He ruled that he would admit the evidence in
the State's case in chief because it was more probative than
prejudicial, and that more harm would occur if the jury
speculated on why defendant was in jail at the time he met the
State's informant than would occur from telling them what he was
convicted of (T. 10-12).

He stated that he would instruct the

jury vigorously not to use the prior conviction as evidence that
defendant committed the offense charged here (T. 12). He also
ruled that the evidence could be admitted to impeach defendant
because the prior conviction was so recent and his resulting
status as a probationer was a motive to be less than truthful
about this offense (T. 11-12).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court admitted the evidence of defendant's
prior conviction in the State's case in chief rather than during
defendant's own testimony.

Thus, the initial analysis is

appropriately undertaken under rules 403 and 404(b).

Under these

rules, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
evidence because it was relevant to establish why the informant

-3-

approached defendant and why defendant trusted the informant
enough to engage in a drug transaction.

Even if the evidence was

inadmissible under these rules, its admission was harmless where
the court actually limited the jury's use of the evidence to
impeachment only and it was proper impeachment under rule
609(a)(1).

Alternatively, the evidence was harmless in any event

as it is unlikely that the result of the trial would have been
different without its admission.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSE WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED AT TRIAL UNDER RULES 403, 404(b) AND
609(a)(1).
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence of
his prior conviction for distribution of cocaine.

The trial

court admitted the evidence over defendant's objections because
it was relevant to the State's case, more probative than
prejudicial, and proper impeachment.

Based upon this ruling, the

State elicited testimony from its first witness, the informant
Mario Trujillo, that defendant told Trujillo he was in jail for
selling cocaine (T. 72). Thus, the evidence actually came before
the jury based upon the court's ruling that the evidence was
relevant to the State's case and more probative than prejudicial.
Later on in the trial, Judge Newey notified counsel
that he intended to instruct the jury that the evidence could be
used for impeachment only (T. 181-83).

On appeal, defendant

argues that the court erred in admitting the evidence as
impeachment.

He ignores the ground on which the evidence was
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admitted, perhaps because the trial court's instructions to the
jury limited the jury's use of the evidence.

Nevertheless, the

evidence did not come before the jury in the traditional
impeachment process, and it is necessary to discuss whether the
Judge's admission of the evidence during the State's
chief was appropriate.

case in

The limitation of the jury's use of the

evidence is relevant to the issue of whether admission of the
evidence was harmful, if it was error.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (1989) allows admission of other
crimes for "purposes[] such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident."

Admission of other crimes under rule

404(b) is limited by Utah R. Evid. 403 (1989) if the probative
value of the other crimes is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.

State v. Gotschall, No. 870294, slip

op. at 6-7 (Utah Oct. 5, 1989); State v. Featherson. No. 880091,
slip op. at 3 (Utah Sept. 26, 1989).

The decision of the trial

court to admit such evidence is discretionary and should not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

Gotschall, at 7.

There

is no abuse of discretion unless the error in admitting the
evidence, if any, was harmful.

Ld.

In this case, defendant conceded that the jury was
entitled to know that the informant met him while the two were in
jail (T. 8-9).

Defendant objected, however, to the jury being

informed of the reason he was in jail:
convicted of selling cocaine.

that he had been

The State, on the other hand,

argued that the evidence was integral to its case because its

theory was that Trujillo approached defendant for this deal
because he knew that defendant had previously engaged in selling
drugs, that defendant trusted Trujillo because they were both in
jail for cocaine distribution, and that the cocaine deal
consequently occurred as Trujillo said it did (T. 7). The
State's need for this evidence is illustrated by defendant's
theory that he was simply agreeing to invest Trujillo's money and
that Trujillo set him up by bringing the cocaine to the park
himself and making it appear as if defendant brought it to sell
to Trujillo (T. 156-59, 165).
The State agrees that generally, prior convictions for
the same or similar offenses should be excluded where there is no
legitimate use that the jury could make of the evidence or where
the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs their probativeness.
See State v. Gentry/ 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987).

While the issue

is not entirely without doubt, the trial court did not err in
admitting the evidence.

Cf.

Gotschall, slip op. at 7 (admission

of evidence of prior bad acts that were relevant to defendant's
state of mind not error, though not without doubt).

The court

correctly concluded that the evidence was relevant to establish
the State's case.

Its refusal to exclude the precise nature of

the prior conviction was not an abuse of discretion where
defendant conceded that the jury could be told that defendant was
in jail with Trujillo and where the jury was carefully instructed
to use the evidence only in judging credibility (R. 55, 56)
(copies in appendix A ) .

Furthermore, the prosecutor specifically

asked the jury not to use the fact that defendant had been

convicted previously of selling cocaine to convict him of this
charge (T. 254-55) (copy in appendix B). For these same reasons,
even if it was error under either Rule 403 or 404(b) to admit the
testimony about the reason for defendant's incarceration, it was
harmless.
A determination of whether admission of the evidence
was harmless, also requires examination of whether the evidence
was admissible for impeachment under Utah R. Evid. 609 (1989).
Defendant argues first that the evidence was not admissible under
Rule 609(a)(2) because the sale of cocaine does not involve
dishonesty or false statement.

The State agrees that it did not

establish that defendant's conviction for selling cocaine
involved dishonesty or false statement and, therefore, concedes
that the conviction was not admissible or admitted under rule
609(a)(2).

See State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Rule 609(a)(1) provides that a defendant's prior

conviction can be elicited on cross-examination if it was
punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year and its
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

Defendant

complains that his conviction was unfairly prejudicial and that
its probative value did not outweigh the prejudice.

The

arguments offered by defendant in favor of suppression of his
conviction cut both ways and render the question a close one, but
do not establish an abuse of discretion requiring reversal of
defendant's conviction.

See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334

(Utah 1986).

7-

Defendant first complains that the court did not
explicitly follow the five factors enumerated in Banner to guide
the court's exercise of discretion.

He claims that the court's

failure to make a finding on all five factors requires reversal
under Wight.

Defendant's analysis of Wight and Banner is

erroneous.
This Court found that the lower court erred in Wight
because it admitted the prior conviction under 609(a)(2) and the
crime was not one that inherently qualified for admission under
that section, 765 P.2d at 17-18. The Wight trial court did not
engage in balancing of probativeness against prejudicial effect
because it did not consider admissibility of the evidence under
Rule 609(a)(1) at all.

This Court implied in Wight that it would

have considered the admissibility of the evidence under 609(a)(1)
if there was any record on which it could have reviewed the
court's decision, 765 P.2d at 19.

Because there was no record

upon which to determine if balancing would have resulted in
admission of the evidence, this Court declined to find that the
evidence was admissible under rule 609(a)(1) and proceeded
instead to a harmless error analysis.
In contrast, while the trial court here did not express
that it was relying on Banner, it articulated its reasons for
admission of the evidence on the record after engaging in a
balancing process (T. 10-13).

As defendant notes, these reasons

fit the first three of the five Banner criteria.

The other two

Banner criteria deal with the importance of credibility issues in
the particular case and the importance of the defendant's
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testimony, 717 P.2d at 1334. These are factors which this Court
can review from the trial record regardless of whether the trial
judge articulated findings on them.

Notably, defendant's

Memorandum in Support of his motion only discussed the three
Banner factors that he complains that the court limited its
ruling to (R. 34). Defendant should not be heard to complain on
appeal that the trial court erred in this regard where he did not
raise the issue below nor object to the form of the court's
ruling.

State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah 1989); Utah

R. Evid. 103(a) (1989).
Defendant's prior crime was admissible under the second
Banner criteria because it was a recent conviction for which he
remained on probation and which provided him with a very strong
motive to fabricate an explanation for his presence at the scene
of his arrest and for his possession of the marked money provided
for the drug buy.

Basically, the trial court found that the

importance of the jury knowing of this motive was strong enough
to outweigh factors one and three that the conviction was for
exactly the same offense and had no per se relevance to his
character for veracity.
Defendant chooses to construe the fourth Banner factor
regarding the importance of credibility in a case "without
decisive nontestimonial evidence,M

Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334, in

a way which favors only exclusion of the prior conviction.

He

states that his credibility was important because the State's
case relied upon the testimony of other persons, thus, his
conviction should have been suppressed.
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Yet, defendant's

possible lack of credibility was important to the State for the
very same reason that his credibility was important to him.

He

had a strong motive to fabricate and Trujillo was subject to
impeachment for his motive to fabricate to obtain early release
from jail.

Weighing these competing interests, this Court should

conclude that defendant's potential lack of credibility weighed
in favor of admission of the evidence.
It is also true that defendant's testimony was
important in this case to establish his theory of the case, the
fifth Banner factor.

There were apparently no other witnesses

who were privy to the arrangement between defendant and Trujillo
who could testify that Trujillo tricked defendant into thinking
that the money in Trujillo's gym bag was for investment rather
than a ruse to implicate defendant in a drug deal so that
Trujillo could obtain an early release from jail.

This factor

alone does not require reversal of this case where other factors
weigh in favor of admission and it was not an abuse of
discretion, therefore, to admit the evidence.
Finally, even if it was error to admit the evidence
under Rule 609(a)(1), it was harmless.

Because an abuse of

discretion under rule 609(a)(1) does not reach constitutional
proportion, the error would be reversible only if after review of
the record there was a reasonable likelihood of a different
result.

Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335. Here it is unlikely that the

result would have been different because defendant agreed that
the jury could be informed that he met Trujillo while in jail.
Furthermore, the jury was instructed to use the evidence for
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evaluating credibility only and the State did not argue that the
evidence should be used for any other purpose.

Indeed, the State

insisted that the jury use the evidence only for impeachment
purposes and succinctly explained in lay terms that
[y)ou shouldn't say, look, I don't even want
to bother with the evidence, this guy was
once convicted of it, he is guilty as sin and
I don't even have to look at the evidence.
And that's what the Judge is trying to
emphasize to you, don't do that, and I'm
telling you not to do that.
(T. 255). He continued by explaining how to use the evidence to
determine credibility:
Say look, this is the word of a person with
that background, with that conviction, do
I — can I believe him? That's a proper area
for you to consider his prior conviction in
evaluating his credibility.
(T. 255). Because the court carefully limited the jury's use of
the conviction despite its ruling that it was admissible for
other purposes, any error in its admission was harmless.

The

result of the trial would not likely have been different even
without admission of the evidence.

See Wight, 765 P.2d at 19-20.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 12-th

day of October,

1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

//SANDRA L^S^pGRBN
/ /
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTION NO.

l¥

The fact that a witness had been convicted of a felony*
if such be a factr may be considered by you only for the purpose
ot

determining

such

conviction

witness1

the

credibility

does

credibility.

not

ot

that witness.

necessarily

destroy

The fact of
or

impair

the

It is one of the circumstances that you

may take into consideration in weighing the testimony of such a
witness.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Evidence

of

a

defendants

1%

previous

conviction

of

a

felony i s to be considered by the juryr only insofar as i t may
affect the c r e d i b i l i t y of the defendant as a witness/ and must
never be considered as evidence of g u i l t of the crime for which
the defendant i s on trial*

APPENDIX B

254

baking soda and then it's boiled.
So you —
you're not —

now, this is —

this is the part where

you're not obligated by anything, you can justj

say, look, this is —

this is how I interpret it in light

of the facts, in light of what happened, that "it's in the
mix M you can say, look, when you consider everything, "it's
in the mix" considering this stuff is mixed and then boiled,
that's —
9 J

it's more reasonable and more rational to conclude!

it that way for you than to say, well, "it's in the mix",

10

that the weed is coming, that the defendant —

11

defendant's version that he testified to.

12

mix."

13 J

Now, this —

that's the

"It's in the

this is your domain, credibility, and

14

decide which version when you have conflicting versions

15

and we often do —

—

of what happened, this is where you

*• I decide who to believe, how much to believe.

You can

17

believe some or all of the witnesses' testimony or if you — |

18

you can believe, as the judge read to you in the instruc-

19 J tions, if you found that he w a s — h e lied about a certain
20

thing, you can disregard his entire testimony.

21

reject it.

M

the jury, credibility.

23

You can

This is the domain, the traditional domain of

Now, credibility is, again, discussed and the judge

24 J emphasizes that to you and it was brought out during the
25

trial, as well.

Credibility with regard to his —

to the

255

defendant's prior conviction, that you shouldn't just out
of hand reject his testimony because he has been convicted
of —

of a similar offense before —

fore.

the same offense be-

You shouldn't say, look, I don't even want to bother

with the evidence, this guy was once convicted of it/ he is
guilty as sin and I don't even have to look at the evidence.
And that's what the Judge is trying to emphasize to you,
don't do that, and I'm telling you not to do that.

And I

know you'll be conscientious in looking over the evidence
before you arrive at a verdict and that you were not prejudiced out of hand against the defendant and that — that
you will consider conscientiously the facts.
That's all we ask of you, and that's what the Judge
emphasized to you, how to —

how to value his credibility.

And the Judge says you can use that conviction when you say,
okay,

there's a conflict in the story.

Who do I believe.

Let's weigh his version against the other version, the
opposing version, as we heard from the State's witnesses.
Now, this is where the instruction says you can consider it
in credibility.

Say look, this is the word of a person

with that background, with that conviction, do I —
believe him?

can I

That's a proper area for you to consider his

prior conviction in evaluating his credibility.

Read the

instructions, if you like.
The deal is set up, the money is given to Mario, the

